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Abstract: This paper studies the empirical relation between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance in Korea using a sample of 
1122 firm-years during 2002-2008. We measure corporate social responsibility by both 
an equal-weighted CSR index and a stakeholder-weighted CSR index suggested by 
Akpinar et al. (2008). Corporate financial performance is measured by ROE, ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. We find a positive and significant relation between corporate financial 
performance and the stakeholder-weighted CSR index, but not the equal-weighted CSR 
index. This finding is robust to alternative model specifications and several additional 
tests, providing evidence in support of instrumental stakeholder theory.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is now seen as an integral part of 
corporate strategy. For example, KPMG (2008) reports that about three-quarters of 
Global Fortune 250 companies surveyed during 2007-2008 have a publicly 
communicated CSR strategy that includes defined objectives. According to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2007 survey (The Economist, 2008), nearly 30 percent of 
surveyed global executives consider CSR as the highest priority issue for their 
organizations with further 40 percent assigning it high priority.  Another evidence for 
the growing importance of CSR is the proliferation of a new corporate title such as chief 
sustainability officer or chief responsibility officer (‘Companies giving green an office’, 
The New York Times, July 3, 2007; ‘The old future is gone’, Forbes, April 1, 2008),2 or 
the rapidly spreading Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) movement that aims at 
combining investors’ financial objectives with their concerns about social, 
environmental, and ethical issues (Eurosif, 2003; Lewis and Mackenzi, 2000; SRI 
Research, 2001-2006).  
Examples of CSR activities abound. They range from Intel’s education and 
development programs in countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti and Uganda, 
General Electric’s charitable donations and investment in environmentally friendly 
practices and products (‘Surprising survivors: corporate do-gooders’, Fortune, January 
20, 2009), Pfizer’s supply of free name-brand drugs to newly unemployed customers 
(‘Why doing good is good for business’, Fortune, February 2, 2010), to Starbucks’ 
offering of health-care benefits and stock to even part-time employees and promotion of 
sound environmental practices by forging partnerships with coffee growers (‘How UPS, 
Starbucks, Disney do good’, Fortune, February 25, 2006). In 2008, the jury of the 
Internatinal Design Excellence Awards also stressed the importance of socially 
responsible product design; it recognized products that promoted sustainability, helped 
the electoral process, eradicated disease, bolstered village education for the poor, etc. 
(‘IDEA Design Trend: Social Responsibility’, BusinessWeek, July 17, 2008). Despite the 
recent financial crunch, many large corporations have been sustaining or expanding 
their CSR budgets. In Australia too, companies such as BHP and Rio Tinto have been 
actively engaging in various community education and development programs in 
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 Chief sustainability officer, usually with the rank of vice president or higher, is in charge of overall 
CSR programs in the corporation. As of 2005, almost all of the 150 largest companies in the world had a 
chief sustainability officer (Willard, 2005).  
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countries where their mining activities could have negative effects.3  
 CSR can be defined as actions that appear to further some social good, beyond 
the interests of the firm and that which is required by law (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001). Important in this definition is that CSR activities are on a voluntary basis, going 
beyond the firm’s legal and contractual obligations. As such it involves a wide range of 
activities such as being employee-friendly, environment-friendly, mindful of ethics, 
respectful of communities where the firms’ plants are located, and even investor-
friendly (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). If CSR activities are beyond the firm’s legal 
obligation and may require some sacrifice in short-term profits, then why do firms 
promote CSR? Is sacrifice of short-term profits compensated by improvement in firms’ 
long-term financial performance? Or are they purely feel-good activities initiated by 
corporate insiders?     
 In academic circles, extensive research has been conducted to assess the 
empirical association between CSR and corporate financial performance under diverse 
geographical contexts. The results of previous studies, however, are largely 
indeterminate. For example, according to ‘instrumental stakeholder theory’ (Jones, 
1995), companies with superior social performance tend to perform better financially by 
attracting socially responsible consumers (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003), alleviating the 
threat of regulation (Lev et al., 2008), improving their reputation with consumers 
(Orlitzky et al., 2003), or soothing concerns from activists and non-governmental 
organizations (Baron, 2001). On the other hand, other researchers argue that trying to 
satisfy the conflicting objectives of different stakeholders might result in inefficient use 
of resources and eventual deterioration of financial performance, and that the costs 
incurred from socially responsible actions may put the firms at an economic 
disadvantage (Aupperle et al., 1985; Ullman, 1985). Still others argue that it is not 
possible to determine the relation between CSR and corporate financial performance 
since there are so many intervening variables that are hard to control (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). It short, it is a moot question whether CSR contributes to or harms 
corporate financial performance for all companies or for all types of CSR activities. 
 This research adds to the empirical literature on the relation between CSR and 
corporate financial performance by providing the first comprehensive evidence from 
Korea using multi-dimensional CSR measures. Business climate in Korea has 
traditionally put more focus on economic value than on softer values such as fair 
distribution of wealth, environmental protection, and community relations etc. Such 
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 Rio Tinto made a total community contribution of $134 million in 2008, the largest component being in various 
community education programs (http://www.riotinto.com/ourapproach/17215_communities_17356.asp). 
. 
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emphasis upon financial success still lingers on particularly when the pursuit of profit 
and social goals tend to collide with each other. The two recent cases of west coast oil 
spill and a large-scale money laundering committed by Korea’s leading conglomerates 
provide telling evidence in this regard.4 These incidents have provided a momentum for 
heated debate about CSR in public arena, led to a rise in public outcry for changing the 
old-fashioned way of doing business, and increased concern for environment and 
transparency in corporate governance. Moreover, with its first sustainability report 
published in 2003, CSR movements emerged as a major social agenda in Korea. In this 
sense, the Korean corporate environment provides a pertinent test case for examining 
the empirical relation between corporate financial prosperity and the extent of corporate 
social initiatives. 
 Despite the growing importance of CSR in Korea, existing Korean studies are 
focused only on corporate environmental performance (Choi et al., 2008; Choi and 
Kwak, 2010 among others). Empirical research examining the association between 
multi-dimensional CSR activities and corporate financial performance in Korea does 
not exist to our knowledge.  As such, this study is the first that provides the Korean 
evidence on the relation between multi-dimensional CSR and corporate financial 
performance. Specifically, we measure CSR performance by the Korea Economic 
Justice Institute (KEJI) index developed by the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
(CCEJ). The CCEJ is one of Korea’s leading NGOs, and it established the KEJI for the 
purpose of evaluating moral management and social responsibility of Korea’s leading 
corporations.5 The KEJI index is the first comprehensive, multi-dimensional CSR index 
developed in Korea, and is comparable to the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) 
index in the US, the Corporate Responsibility Index in Australia, and the Asahi 
Foundation index of Japan. 
 Our main findings can be summarized as follows. There is a positive and 
significant relation between CSR and corporate financial performance when CSR is 
measured by a stakeholder-weighted index that takes into account the degree with which 
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 On December the 7th, 2007, a large scale oil-spill accident occurred off the coast of Tae-an, South Korea, 
caused by reckless sailing of a tugboat owned by one of the leading Korean shipbuilders amidst hostile 
weather condition. The crude oil leakage of about 12,000 tons was the largest in Korea, resulting in the 
devastation of regional economy with the estimated total damage of $519 million, not to mention the 
colossal damage to the ecosystem. The company involved paid only $5 million to the affected 
community, and the compensation case is still unresolved as of early 2010. In another case involving a 
massive earnings manipulation amounting to some $1.2 billion, committed by another leading Korean 
conglomerate in 2003, the CEO and other responsible executives were sentenced to probation, on the 
ground that the accounting fraud was intended to help alleviate the financial difficulties incumbent upon 
the whole group.  
5
 More details on the CCEJ and KEJI can be found at http://www.ccej.or.kr/English/. 
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specific stakeholder groups are prioritized. When CSR is measured by an equal-
weighted index, the relation is insignificant. These results hold for all three financial 
performance variables that we use, i.e., ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. The positive 
association between the stakeholder-weighted CSR index and corporate financial 
performance is robust to alternative model specifications and several additional tests, 
further strengthening the case for using stakeholder-weighted metric in measuring CSR. 
In an additional analysis of the bi-directional relation between CSR and corporate 
financial performance after controlling for potential endogeneity, we also find that high 
levels of corporate financial performance have a positive impact on the stakeholder-
weighted CSR index. Thus we conclude that, on average, Korean firms can do well by 
doing good on the one hand, and firms that do well can spend money for good causes on 
the other, demonstrating the existence of a virtuous cycle.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
related literature. Section 3 describes research design while Section 4 reports the 
empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper with some discussions.  
 
II. Related Literature 
 
 The empirical literature examining the relation between CSR and corporate 
financial performance is extensive.  As discussed previously, however, the results are 
generally mixed, which could be attributed to the various ways corporate financial 
performance and CSR have been operationally defined (Carroll, 1979; Orlitzky et al., 
2003), to the lack of appropriate statistical controls (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Wood 
and Jones, 1995), or to the ‘stakeholder misalignment’ problem (Wood and Jones, 1995; 
Akpinar et al., 2008).   
 Typically used firm performance variables are accounting-based measures such 
as ROE and ROA, and the market-based measure such as Tobin’s Q.  As for corporate 
social performance, existing studies have used a diversity of measures. Earlier studies 
relied on various reputational indices, such as Moskowitz’s (1972, 1975) tripartite 
ratings of ‘outstanding’, ‘honorable mention’, and ‘worst’ companies (Cochran and 
Wood 1984; Sturdivant and Ginter 1997), or the Fortune’s ratings of a corporation’s 
responsibility to the community and environment (Conine and Madden 1987; Fombrun 
and Shanley 1990; McGuire et al. 1998). Another widely used index is the measure 
provided by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) based on social audits. Various 
studies have used the CEP social audit ranking of companies’ pollution records 
(Bragdon and Marlin 1972; Fogler and Nutt 1975; Spicer 1978; Blackburn et al., 1994). 
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The KLD index is one of the most recent measures designed to explicitly evaluate 
multiple dimensions of a company’s social and financial performance.6 Many recent 
studies rely on the KLD index to measure CSR in investigating the relation between 
CSR and CFP (McWilliams et al., 2006; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Akpinar et al., 2008; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997; Berman et al., 1999).   
 Table 1 provides a summary of selected empirical studies where the second 
column indicates the statistical relation between CSR and corporate financial 
performance. As shown in the table, some studies report a positive relation while others 
report a mixed or negative relation. In regards to the mixed evidence, McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000) stress the importance of including other variables that are acknowledged 
to be important determinants of corporate financial performance. For example, they 
show that, once R&D investment is included in the equation, the positive relation 
between CSR and corporate financial performance is no longer significant.  
 
[Table 1 goes about here.] 
 
 The so-called ‘stakeholder misalignment’ problem suggested by Wood and 
Jones (1995) is that of relating stakeholder-specific variables to a set of aggregated 
stakeholder variables ignoring many differences between different stakeholder groups. 
They argue that the research on CSR should take into account the fact that a company 
should weigh which sub-dimensions of social performance are perceived to be 
important by its stakeholders. To circumvent the stakeholder misalignment problem, 
Lev et al. (2008) classify firms into two groups based on the degree of sensitivity to 
consumer perceptions. The first group consists of firms belonging to industries where 
sensitivity to consumer perception is high such as consumer goods and finance 
industries, and the second group has firms operating in industries where sensitivity to 
consumer perception is low. They empirically show that firms producing goods and 
services purchased by individual consumers are more likely to enhance their revenue 
from having a reputation as a good corporate citizen than firms that produce goods and 
services for industrial or government use. Akpinar et al. (2008) measure CSR by a 
stakeholder-weighted CSR index which aggregates the index scores for CSR sub-
dimensions after taking into account stakeholder conflicts and varying importance of 
different CSR sub-dimensions in different industries. They find a significantly positive 
association between CSR and corporate financial performance when the stakeholder-
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 The KLD index, developed by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini, rates companies based on five criteria, 
along a scale of -2 to +2, depending upon their social performance, and provides data on financial 
performance of socially screened portfolios.  For details, see http://www.kld.com/indexes/index.html. 
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weighted CSR index is used to measure CSR. Our paper is also in the same vein as 
Akpinar et al. (2008) in that we develop a stakeholder-weighted CSR index. 
 With a steady increase in the number and kind of stakeholder groups interested 
in broader corporate social performance (Shapiro, 1992), a number of studies have 
elaborated on or empirically tested the instrumental stakeholder theory (Alexander and 
Buchholz, 1978; Berman et al., 1999; Bowman and Haire, 1975; Jones, 1995; Margolis 
and Walsh, 2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Graves and Waddock (1994), and Teoh 
and Shiu (1990) argue that institutional investors are favorably inclined toward 
companies with better social performance when other factors are held constant and 
independent information on social performance is available. Bowman and Haire (1975) 
contend that other stakeholders in addition to stockholders and bondholders may regard 
CSR as an indication of management skill. Alexander and Buchholz (1978) also suggest 
that CSR makes firms an attractive investment target since investors evaluate socially 
aware and concerned management as possessing the requisite skill to run a superior 
company. Similarly, Spicer (1978) finds a positive association between stock price and 
corporate social performance and suggests that the latter provides information about 
management competence. Along the same line, Waddock and Graves (1997) report a 
positive relation between CSR and the quality of management, where the latter is 
measured by the Fortune reputation survey ranking.  
 Among related Korean research, Choi et al. (2008) study the relation between 
corporate environmental disclosure and financial performance over the seven-year 
period following the financial crisis of 1997. They find no significant relation between 
the quality of disclosure and economic performance while corporate size and industry 
profile are shown to be the most significant factor behind corporate environmental 
disclosure. More recently, Choi and Kwak (2010) study the relation between the level of 
corporate environmental disclosure and environmental performance using the sample of 
180 cases of stand-alone environmental reports and/or environmental information 
disclosed on corporate websites. They document a positive association between 
corporate environmental performance and the level of discretionary environmental 
disclosure. As mentioned previously, however, we are not aware of any Korean studies 
that use a comprehensive, multi-dimensional CSR measure in investigating the relation 
between CSR and corporate financial performance. 
 
III. The Empirical Model and Variable Description 
 
3.1 The Empirical model 
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We start with the following cross-sectional regression model:  
 
itijt
j
jitit CONTROLCSRindexCFP   10                 (1) 
where CFP denotes corporate financial performance, CSRindex denotes the corporate 
social responsibility index, CONTROL stands for various control variables, subscripts 
index firm (i) and time (t), and εit is an i.i.d. error term. Equation (1) is designed to 
investigate the relation between CFP and CSR index on a cross-sectional basis where 
the former is measured using firm-level performance measures such as accounting- 
and/or market-based indicators. However, cross-sectional regression models are not 
likely to control other variables that are acknowledged to be major determinants of 
corporate financial performance over a period of time. 
We thus employ Carhart’s (1997) four-factor market model in addition to 
equation (1) in order to see whether market-based financial performance incorporates 
corporate social performance as well. To use Carhart’s four-factor model, we rank firms 
according to their CSR index order and construct two portfolios by including firms from 
the first decile in the top portfolio and those from the tenth decile in the bottom 
portfolio. We then calculate the difference in monthly returns between the top and 
bottom portfolios, which shows a return on hedge portfolio that can be earned by taking 
a long position in the most socially responsible firms and a short position in the least 
socially responsible counterparts. Next, to obtain factor-mimicking portfolios on a 
monthly basis, we reclassify the firms belonging to the top and bottom portfolios 
according to each of the four factors suggested by Carhart. To control for the effects of 
these factors, the difference in monthly returns between the upper and lower halves of 
respective factor groups is used as a dependent variable. Our focus is on the intercept 
term of the four-factor market model since it tells us whether the CSR-based hedge 
portfolio earns a positive return after controlling for the four factors included in the 
model. Our second model to be estimated is as follows: 
tttttt MomentumHMLSMBRMRFR   43210          (2) 
where 𝑅𝑡  is the difference in monthly returns between the top and bottom portfolios, 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡  is the portfolio return that mimics the market risk premium factor, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the 
portfolio return mimicking the size factor, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the portfolio return mimicking the 
growth factor, and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑡  is the portfolio return mimicking the momentum factor. 
The intercept term α0 in equation (2) represents the abnormal return on a zero-
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investment strategy that buys the top portfolio and sells short the bottom portfolio. If it 
is positive and significant, then we can say that there is a difference in market 
performance of top and bottom portfolios even after removing the influence from the 
four factors. Such a difference can be due to the difference in CSR since our hedge 
portfolios are based on firms’ CSR index scores. 
 
3.2 Variable Description 
 
3.2.1 Corporate Financial Performance 
 
For corporate financial performance, we follow the literature and use both 
accounting-based and market-based financial performance measures. As accounting-
based performance measures, we use ROA = EBIT / total asset, and ROE = EBIT / 
owner’s capital.  Our market-based performance measure is Tobin’s Q following 
Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) definition: Tobin’s Q = (market value of common stock + 
market value of preferred stock + current liability – current asset + long-term debt) / 
book value of total asset. 
 
3.2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
To measure corporate social performance by Korean firms, we use two proxies 
based on the Korea Economic Justice Institute (KEJI) index developed by the Citizens’ 
Coalition for Economic Justice. The KEJI index, introduced in 1991, is the first 
comprehensive evaluation scheme for corporate business ethics and social responsibility 
developed and implemented in Korea.7 Each year, the KEJI selects annual Economic 
Justice Award winners. The KEJI’s procedure to select award winners consists of both 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation. Quantitative evaluation is applied to Korean 
companies listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX) on the basis of annual reports, news 
reports, and other information available from governmental authorities such as the 
National Tax Service, the Fair Trade Commission, and the KRX, excluding those firms 
under serious financial trouble.8 Qualitative evaluation is subsequently conducted by 
sending questionnaires to the overall top 10% firms and top 20% firms for each of the 
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 The index was subsequently modified and refined in 1993 based on wide consultation with the 
representatives from academia, journalists, governmental authorities, labor union, NGOs, business 
community, and general public. 
8
 Criteria for exclusion include the following: three consecutive years of net losses, less than 1.0 debt-to-
equity ratio, lower than 1.0 times-interest-rate (interest expense plus EBIT divided by EBIT), merger 
target, and newly listed companies whose financial data are unavailable. 
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Korean SIC-based industry based on their KEJI index scores.  The main purpose of 
qualitative evaluation is to collect non-public information to determine final award 
winners. The KEJI annually discloses the scores of top 200 companies in its brochure 
with the names of three award winners.   
The KEJI index is comparable to the CEP index in the US, the Corporate 
Responsibility Index in Australia, the Asahi Foundation index of Japan, and several 
other corporate ethics indices of European countries. One of the distinctive features of 
the KEJI index is that it is a product of an independent rating service that focuses on the 
evaluation of multidimensional corporate social performance. It gives a score on seven 
individual categories of CSR: soundness, fairness, contribution to society, consumer 
protection, environmental protection, employee satisfaction, and contribution to 
economy.9 We develop two proxies based on the KEJI index. As explained in footnote 8, 
the original KEJI index assigns different maximum scores to different individual 
categories, which is rather arbitrary.  Thus we converted original scores for individual 
categories to scores that take the maximum value of 100.  For example, a score of 20 
for the soundness category is converted to 20*(100/25) = 80 since the maximum score 
for the soundness category is 25. This way, the maximum total score becomes 700. 
The first proxy is defined as the simple sum of scores for seven categories of 
the KEJI index:  
)3((EW)index  CSR weighted-Equal
7
1
it 


k
iktx
 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡  is the score for firm i, the KEJI category k for year t, which takes the 
maximum value of 100 as described above. This approach has an obvious drawback in 
that it assumes all KEJI categories are equally important to all stakeholders. As 
discussed in the instrumental stakeholder theory, firms with different interests may need 
to attend to different stakeholders differently (Wood and Jones, 1995). Depending on the 
specific areas of social responsibility considered to be important by major stakeholders, 
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 More specifically, the soundness category comprises stockholder composition, investment, financing, 
and is assigned a maximum score of 25. The fairness category consists of fair trade, economic 
concentration, transparency, supplier relationship, and is assigned a maximum score of 15. The 
contribution to society category considers care for minority groups, corporate donation, and is assigned 
a maximum score of 10. The consumer protection category comprises protection of consumer 
sovereignty, product quality and promotion with a maximum score of 10. The environmental protection 
category covers environmental improvement efforts, environmental friendliness, and compliance with 
environmental regulation with a maximum score of 15. The employee satisfaction category consists of 
workplace safety, human resource investment, wage and welfare, labor-management relationship, and 
gender equality with a maximum score of 15. The contribution to economy category relates to R&D 
efforts, operating performance, and contribution to economy through tax payment, productivity growth 
and export, for which a maximum score of 10 is given. More details on the KEJI index and its scoring 
system are available from the authors.     
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firms may exert different levels of effort to different categories of social responsibility, 
hence are likely to receive different scores for different CSR categories. Our first proxy 
for CSR suffers from the lack of a weighting scheme for the different categories of CSR. 
We thus introduce weighted measures of CSR, as proposed by Akpinar et al. (2008).  
Akpinar et al. (2008) argue that stakeholder-weighted CSR index is a new CSR 
measure that reflects the relative importance of each stakeholder group based on the 
industry to which individual firms belong. In order to operationalize the second proxy 
for CSR, we first classify our sample firms into eighteen industries according to the 
Korean Standard Industry Classification codes. After this, the KEJI index score for each 
of the seven categories is summed up to obtain an aggregate score of social performance 
for that particular industry-year. Then individual sums for each of the seven categories 
are divided by this overall sum to compute the weights for each of the seven categories 
for every industry-year. After having the weights for every industry-year, we multiply 
the raw KEJI index scores with associated weights to obtain the stakeholder-weighted 
CSR index for every firm-year: 
)4((SW)index  CSR weighted-rStakeholde
7
1
it jkt
k
ijkt Weightx 

 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  is the score for firm i in industry j, the KEJI category k for year t, 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗𝑘𝑡  = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑗𝑘𝑡 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑗𝑘𝑡7𝑘=1 , and 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑡  is the average score for industry j, the 
KEJI category k for year t. As is clear from the definition, the weight measures how an 
industry scores in a particular KEJI category relative to the average performance of that 
industry in overall CSR. To the extent that different industries perform better in different 
KEJI categories possibly because their CSR activities are directed towards the interests 
of their primary stakeholders, one can interpret these weights as reflecting varying 
stakeholder interests. Indeed our data lend support to this interpretation: environmental 
protection is given the highest weight in the chemical and hard-coal industry, employee 
satisfaction in the metal industry, and consumer protection in the retail trade industry.10 
 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
 
We use several control variables that are consistently shown to be related to 
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 As a referee correctly pointed out, an alternative interpretation of these weights is the relative 
competitive position of each industry on their CSR activities. Our interpretation is not inconsistent with 
this interpretation if we accept the assumption, which we believe is innocuous, that an industry’s CSR 
activities are geared towards the interests of its primary stakeholders. This assumption is also supported 
by McWilliams et al. (2006). 
12 
 
corporate financial performance. These control variables can be broadly broken down 
into two groups of firm characteristics and management preferences. The firm 
characteristics group includes size (Arlow and Gannon, 1982; Shin and Stulz, 1998), 
risk (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000) and sales growth (De, 1992). To control for the past 
corporate performance, we also lag sales growth by one year and include it as an 
additional control. We take logarithm of total assets to measure firm size and define firm 
risk using long term debt divided by total asset. We include sales growth for year t using 
log of sales in year t divided by sales of year t-1. We also include lagged sales growth 
for year t, which is measured by sales of year t-1 divided by sales of year t-2. 
Management preference variables include R&D expenditure standardized by total assets 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). Lastly, we also control for industry and year effects by 
including 8 industry- and 2 year-dummy variables to distinguish 9 industries and 3 years 
under coverage in this study.  Thus our control variables are SIZE = Log (total asset), 
RISK = Long-term debt / total asset, ΔSalest = log (Sales for year t / Sales for year t-1), 
ΔSalest-1 = log (Sales for year t-1 / Sales for year t-2), and R&D = R&D expenditure / 
total asset. 
 
3.2.4 Variables Used in Carhart’s (1997) Four-Factor Model 
 
In estimating Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model (equation (2)), we measure Rt 
as the difference in monthly returns between top and bottom portfolios and RMRFt as 
the market return in month t minus the risk-free rate. SMBt (small minus big), HMLt 
(high minus low), and Momentumt are the month t returns on zero-investment factor-
mimicking portfolios designed to capture size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, 
respectively. Each of the factor-mimicking portfolios is measured by computing the 
differences in monthly returns between the upper and lower half of the firms rank-
ordered according to each of the factors.  
 
IV. Empirical Results  
 
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our sample is drawn from companies listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX)11 for 
                                            
11
 The Korea Exchange (KRX) was created through the integration of the three existing Korean spot & 
futures exchanges (Korea Stock Exchange, Korea Futures Exchange and KOSDAQ) under the Korea 
Stock & Futures Exchange Act. As of 31 December 2007, the KRX had 1,757 listed companies with a 
combined market capitalization of $1.1 trillion. For more details, see http://www.krx.co.kr. 
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which the KEJI index is available. While the selection of our sample is inevitably 
limited to those firms that appear on the KEJI index, hence subject to possible selection 
bias, we are not aware of any alternative reliable measures of CSR in Korea comparable 
to the KEJI index in its coverage, and measurement validity.  For our sample firms, 
financial data are retrieved from the TS-2000 database.12 Up to 2001, the KEJI index 
had only six categories and from 2002, the index was expanded to include an additional 
category. In order to maintain consistency of our data, we have used the seven-category 
KEJI index scores from 2002. Thus our sample period covers seven years from 2002 to 
2008 and the final sample includes 1,222 firm-years from both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing industries. 
 
We classify sample firms into eighteen industries using the Korean Standard 
Industry Classification codes. The distribution of sample firms based on their industry 
classification is shown in Table 2, while the weights for each of the seven KEJI 
categories for each industry are shown in Table 3. These weights are used to calculate 
the stakeholder-weighted CSR index on an annual basis. As shown in Table 3, 
environmental protection is given the highest weight in the chemical and hard-coal 
industry (weight = 0.19) while consumer protection is the highest in the retail trade 
industry (weight = 0.17). 
[Tables 2 and 3 go about here.] 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation are summarized in 
Table 4. The standard deviations of EW and SW are relatively small, suggesting that our 
sample consists of relatively homogeneous group of firms in their perceived CSR 
activities.  
[Table 4 goes about here.] 
 
4.2 Correlation and Analysis of variance 
 
As discussed previously, good management theory or instrumental stakeholder 
theory predict a positive relation between corporate social performance and financial 
performance. Table 5 reports Pearson correlation coefficients and provides some 
preliminary evidence in support of this.  While EW is shown to be positively 
                                            
12
 TS-2000 stands for Business Information Total Solution 2000, which is a Korean version of CRSP 
database, developed by Korea Listed Companies Association. It provides financial information on KRX- 
and KOSDAQ-listed companies and industrial data for statistics and analysis. 
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correlated with ROA only, SW is positively correlated with all three performance 
measures. SIZE is positively correlated with both EW and SW, which is consistent with 
a commonly shared view that, as firm size increases, corporate responsibility tends to 
increase as well. 
 
[Table 5 goes about here.] 
 
Using a series of one-way ANOVA tests, Table 6 examines the mean differences 
among three different groups of CSR for corporate financial performance. In panel A, 
we used the equal-weighted CSR index to rank the sample firms, while in panel B, we 
used the stakeholder-weighted CSR index.  In both panels, corporate financial 
performance for firms with higher CSR index is shown to be higher than those with 
lower CSR index. This is true for all three financial performance variables and the 
difference among the three groups of firms is statistically significant.  In sum, both 
Tables 5 and 6 seem to suggest a positive relation between CSR and corporate financial 
performance. We examine this more rigorously below. 
 
[Table 6 goes about here.] 
 
4.3 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
 
This section reports the results from the cross-sectional regression analysis, 
specified in equation (1).  The dependent variable is corporate financial performance, 
measured by ROA, ROE, or Tobin’s Q.  In Table 7, Model 1 reports the results when 
the equal-weighted CSR index (EW) and five control variables are used as independent 
variables, while Model 2 reports the results when the stakeholder-weighted CSR index 
(SW) is used along with the same set of control variables. Both models used dummy 
variables to control for industry- and year-effects, but the results are not shown in the 
table for brevity.  Both models are shown to have significant explanatory power at the 
conventional level.  However, the coefficient to EW is not significant in Model 1 
regardless of how corporate financial performance is measured.  On the other hand, 
Model 2 shows that the coefficient to SW is positive and statistically significant for all 
three financial performance variables.  This implies that, when CSR is measured while 
taking into account firm-specific stakeholders’ interests, there is a positive association 
between corporate financial performance and CSR. We do note, however, that our 
results should not be interpreted to render direct support to good management theory or 
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instrumental stakeholder theory. While both theories suggest a positive link from CSR 
to corporate financial performance, our results do not imply causality in either direction, 
for which we need longer and more comprehensive time-series data. We discuss this 
issue in Section 4.5. 
 
[Table 7 goes about here.] 
 
4.4 Estimation of the Four-factor Model 
 
Table 8 reports the estimation results from Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, 
specified in equation (2).  As discussed previously, the dependent variable in this 
regression is the difference in monthly returns between top and bottom portfolios ranked 
based on their KEJI indices, and independent variables are RMRF, SMB, HML, and 
Momentum. The intercept term α0 captures the abnormal return on the zero-investment 
strategy of buying the top decile portfolio and selling short the bottom decile portfolio. 
We estimated two models using the equal-weighted and stakeholder-weighted CSR 
indices to form top and bottom portfolios.  
Table 8 shows that α0 is not significantly different from zero (t = 0.79) when the 
sample firms are ranked based on the equal-weighted CSR index, but it is positive and 
significant (t = 3.98) when the stakeholder-weighted CSR index is used to rank the 
sample firms. We can interpret the latter result to imply that there is a 31.1 basis point 
difference in monthly returns between the two portfolios that can be explained by the 
firms’ corporate social performance.  This is in addition to the difference that can be 
explained by Carhart’s four factors. Once again, our result indicates a positive 
association between CSR and corporate financial performance when firms prioritize 
their CSR activities based on their stakeholder interests. 
 
[Table 8 goes about here.] 
 
4.5 Additional Analyses 
 
As discussed previously, the various theories in the management literature 
predict different links between corporate social performance and financial performance. 
On the one hand, good management theory or instrumental stakeholder theory suggest a 
positive link from corporate social performance to financial performance. According to 
slack resources theory (Ullmann, 1985; Waddock and Graves 1997), however, the link 
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is reversed: financially healthy firms can afford to engage in more CSR activities, which 
in turn are likely to improve financial performance further, particularly when the CSR 
activities are properly directed toward stakeholder preferences.   
As an additional test, we address such an endogeneity issue by estimating the 
following simultaneous equation system after controlling for endogeneity by employing 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis:  
 
Equation 1: ttttt SIZECSRindexCFPCSRindex 131210     
Equation 2: 
 
tttt
ttttt
DRRISKSales
SalesSIZECSRindexCSRindexCFP
2765
1431210
& 


 
    
   (5)
 
 
The results are presented in Table 913. As can be seen in panel B of the table, only 
the estimated coefficients for stakeholder-weighted CSR (SW) are positive and 
statistically significant, which is consistent with previous results. Panel A also shows 
that high levels of financial performance provide slack resources necessary to engage in 
CSR with which stakeholders are prioritized. In a nutshell, Table 9 shows that CSR 
activities which take stakeholders’ priority into account can have a positive impact upon 
corporate financial performance, which in turn feeds back to stakeholder-oriented CSR 
activities. These results support Waddock and Graves’ (1997) argument in favor of a 
‘virtuous cycle’ between CSR and corporate financial performance. 
 
[Table 9 goes about here.] 
 
To address any statistical causation between CSR and corporate financial 
performance, we also conduct Granger causality tests. Because the selection of firms on 
the KEJI index varies year to year, we could identify only 40 firms in our sample that 
had seven consecutive years of time-series data on the KEJI index. Partial results from 
Granger causality tests for this sub-sample are presented in Table 10 where financial 
performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. Panels A and B show that causality runs in 
neither direction when CSR is measured by EW while Panels C and D suggest bilateral 
                                            
13
 We also conducted Hausman’s test to detect the presence of any endogenous relation between CSR 
and CFP. Untabulated results of Hausman’s test indicate that there is endogeneity between CSR and CFP. 
This result suggests that it is necessary to employ the simultaneous equations model as in (5).  
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causality when CSR is measured by SW.  Once more, these results provide support for 
the virtuous cycle between CSR and corporate financial performance.14 
 
 [Table 10 goes about here.] 
 
Finally, we conduct further analyses to check the robustness of our findings. First, 
for each CSR index presented in Table 6, we replicate the difference test across the four 
CSR groups using non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test. The results from this test are 
qualitatively similar, and with comparable level of significance, to those reported in the 
parametric ANOVA-test.15 Second, we replicate our regressions by calculating EW and 
SW for each of the seven CSR categories in the KEJI index and use them as the CSR 
variable. Again the results are similar in that there is a positive and significant 
association between corporate financial performance and only the stakeholder-weighted 
CSR index except for the two categories of contribution to society and consumer 
protection.  Partial results of this analysis are provided in Table 11 where financial 
performance is measure by Tobin’s Q. 
 
[Table 11 goes about here.] 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The existing studies on the relation between CSR and corporate financial 
performance provide mixed results. This study was motivated by the lack of consistent 
evidence on the one hand and the relative paucity of research in the Korean context on 
the other. We have investigated the relation between CSR and corporate financial 
performance using a sample of Korean firms where CSR is measured by the KEJI index, 
the first comprehensive, multi-dimensional CSR measure in Korea. The main 
contribution of this paper is two-fold.  First, our research design improves upon many 
existing studies in several ways by (i) circumventing the stakeholder misalignment 
problem with use of the stakeholder-weighted CSR index, (ii) employing Carhart’s 
(1997) four-factor model to control for other variables that are known to be important 
determinants of corporate financial performance, (iii) conducting additional analysis of 
bi-directional relation between CSR and corporate financial performance after 
controlling for potential endogeneity, and (iv) carrying out Granger causality tests for 
                                            
14
 We also replicated the analysis using ROA and ROE and arrived at qualitatively similar results, which 
are available from the authors.  
15
 The results are not reported, but available from the authors. 
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CSR and corporate financial performance. Second, our study provides the first 
comprehensive evidence from Korea on the relation between multi-dimensional CSR 
and corporate financial performance. 
 Our main finding is that there is a positive and significant association between 
corporate financial performance and the stakeholder-weighted CSR measure, but not the 
equal-weighted CSR measure. The positive association is robust to alternative model 
specifications and several additional tests, further strengthening the case for using 
stakeholder-weighted metric in measuring CSR. These results suggest that it is 
important for a firm to realize which aspect of its social responsibility is more important 
to its primary stakeholders and that a firm’s social initiatives, when properly directed, 
tend to improve its bottom line in Korea.  
 We conclude the paper with discussions on some limitations of this study that 
need to be addressed in future studies. First, we have not clearly addressed the concern 
for a possible bias in sample selection. Our sample is drawn from a population of firms 
selected by the CCEJ for construction of its KEJI index. The selected firms tend to be 
large with superior position in terms of financial performance and CSR. However, this 
limitation is inevitable since the KEJI index is the only reliable multi-dimensional CSR 
measure available in Korea. Second, while the KEJI index is considered to be the most 
reliable measure of CSR currently available in Korea, it has room for further 
improvement in the way firms are selected and in the process whereby qualitative and 
quantitative assessments determine the final score. Finally, the seven-year period this 
study covers may not be long enough to generalize the results. It would be necessary to 
exercise caution when deriving inference from the results of this study. In future 
research, we expect to extend the coverage of sample firms both by using augmented 
datasets on CSR and by experimenting with alternative model specifications.  
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Table 1: Summary of Selected Empirical Studies 
 
Authors Sign  Measure of CSR 
Measure of firm 
performance 
Bragdon and Marlin (1972) (+) CEP index EPS growth, ROE, ROC 
Bowman and Haire (1975) (+) Carroll's (1979) CSR 
construct and CEP index ROE 
Fogler and Nutt (1975) neutral CEP index P/E ratio 
Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) (+) Moskowitz reputation index EPS growth 
Alexander and Buchholz (1978) (+) Reputation ratings Market return on security 
Spicer (1978) (+) CEP index ROE 
Cochran and Wood (1984) (+) Moskowitz reputation index Abnormal return 
Aupperle et al., (1985) (-) Carroll's (1979) CSR 
construct ROA 
Conine and Madden (1987) (+) Erdos and Morgan's corporate 
reputation survey 
Perceptual/expectational 
survey measures 
McGuire et al. (1988) mixed  Fortune index ROA, sales growth, asset growth 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990) neutral Charitable contributions, Fortune index ROIC, market-to-book ratio 
Teoh and Shiu (1990)  neutral CSR disclosure Institutional investors’ 
survey questionnaire 
Blackburn et al. (1994) (+) CEP index ROA, abnormal return, EPS 
Waddock and Graves (1997) (+) KLD index ROA, ROE, return on sales 
Berman et al. (1999) (+) KLD index ROA 
Teoh et al. (1999) neutral Divestment from South Africa Abnormal return 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) neutral KLD index ROA 
Orlitzky et al. (2003) mixed KLD index P/E ratio, ROE, ROA 
Akpinar et al. (2008) (+) KLD index Stock return, Tobin's Q 
Lev et al. (2008) (+) Charitable contributions Sales growth 
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Table 2: Sample Distribution by Industry 
 
Industry Classification Frequency % 
Manufacture of Basic Metal Products 73 6.0 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 48 3.9 
Manufacture of other machinery and equipment 70 5.7 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 56 4.6 
Manufacture of wearing apparel, Clothing  38 3.1 
Manufacture of food product and beverage 93 7.6 
Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal Chemicals 171 14.0 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 96 7.9 
Manufacture of Electronic Components, Computer, Radio, 
Television and Communication Equipment and Apparatuses 
122 10.0 
Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 31 2.5 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 175 14.3 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 18 1.5 
Professional Services 32 2.6 
Manufacture of coke, hard-coal products 19 1.6 
Wholesales trade and commission trade 33 2.7 
Retail trade 31 2.5 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 32 2.6 
General construction 84 6.9 
Total  1,222 100 
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Table 3: Mean Weights by Industry and the KEJI Category over 2002-2008. 
 
   Categories 
Industries Soundness Fairness 
Contribution 
to Society 
Consumer 
Protection 
Environmental 
Protection 
Employee 
Satisfaction 
Contribution 
to Economy 
Metal 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 
Rubber 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.12 
Machinery 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 
Mineral 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 
Clothing 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.1 
Food 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.11 
Medicine 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.1 0.12 0.17 0.13 
Vehicles 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.1 0.14 0.18 0.14 
Electronics 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.15 
Paper 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.11 
Chemical 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.12 
Fabricated 
metal 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 
Professional 
Services 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.13 
Hard-coal 0.18 0.2 0.1 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.11 
Wholesales 
Trade 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.1 
Retail Trade 0.2 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.1 
Electricity 
Supply 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.1 
Construction 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.12 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
       Mean     S.D      Min    Median     Max 
ROA 0.071 0.052 -0.166 0.065 0.348 
ROE 0.124 0.099 -0.188 0.115 0.593 
Tobin's Q 0.917 0.397 0.114 0.821 2.991 
EW 416.098 24.141 362.711 412.927 523.692 
SW 61.657 3.412 54.101 61.136 76.752 
SIZE 12.835 1.482 10.001 12.463 18.099 
1 tSales  0.030 0.067 -0.173 0.032 0.392 
tSales  0.031 0.079 -0.147 0.031 0.432 
RISK 0.109 0.090 0.000 0.083 0.382 
R&D 0.016 0.020 0.000 0.014 0.164 
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Table 5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
 ROA ROE Tobin's Q EW SW SIZE 1 tSales  tSales  RISK R&D 
ROA   0.752*** 0.284*** 0.167** 0.241*** 0.031 0.252*** 0.273*** -0.104*** 0.162*** 
ROE     0.290*** 0.088 0.193*** 0.173*** 0.258*** 0.322*** -0.132*** 0.087*** 
Tobin's Q       0.038 0.333** 0.285*** 0.134*** 0.087*** -0.120*** 0.347*** 
EW         0.572*** 0.260** 0.074 0.057* 0.004 0.331*** 
SW           0.354*** 0.065 0.062* 0.040 0.315*** 
SIZE             0.069** 0.079*** 0.387*** 0.044* 
1 tSales                0.261*** 0.057** 0.089*** 
tSales                  0.035* 0.010 
RISK                   -0.026 
R&D                     
Note: ***, **, * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6: Results of Variance Analysis 
 
Panel A : EW is the classification variable to group the sample firms 
  Bottom 25% Middle 50% Top 25% F-Value 
ROA 0.0582 0.0689 0.0871 5.42*** 
ROE 0.0711 0.0847 0.1059 2.41** 
Tobin's Q 0.7594 0.9059 1.543 1.99* 
Panel B : SW is the classification variable to group the sample firms 
  Bottom 25% Middle 50% Top 25% F-Value 
ROA 0.0584 0.0650 0.0952 6.38*** 
ROE 0.0674 0.0796 0.1209 9.73*** 
Tobin's Q 0.5090 0.9259 1.3537 15.41*** 
***, **, * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7: Estimation Results for Corporate Financial Performance 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
ROA ROE Tobin's Q ROA ROE Tobin's Q 
EW 
0.036 
(1.58) 
0.019 
(1.35) 
0.002 
(0.33)    
SW    
0.252*** 
(5.54) 
0.214*** 
(4.35) 
0.542*** 
(3.36) 
SIZE 
0.002* 
(1.83) 
0.007*** 
(3.12) 
0.068*** 
(7.15) 
0.000* 
(1.90) 
0.005*** 
(3.12) 
0.039*** 
(5.95) 
1 tSales  0.145
***
 
(7.07) 
0.246*** 
(6.17) 
0.602*** 
(3.43) 
0.117*** 
(7.05) 
0.271*** 
(5.17) 
0.600*** 
(3.42) 
tSales  0.151
***
 
(8.67) 
0.326*** 
(9.67) 
0.528*** 
(3.55) 
0.130*** 
(8.65) 
0.208*** 
(4.03) 
0.517*** 
(3.51) 
RISK 
-0.082*** -0.061* -0.238* -0.079*** 
(-4.99) 
-0.039* 
(-1.81) 
-0.251*** 
(-1.82) (-5.14) (-1.95) (-1.73) 
R&D 
0.229*** 
(2.81) 
0.026 
(0.16) 
5.182*** 
(7.41) 
0.240*** 
(2.95) 
0.017 
(0.11) 
5.229*** 
(7.50) 
Adj- 2R  0.298 0.263 0.332 0.315 0.280 0.446 
F-statistic 18.91*** 15.93*** 32.96*** 20.84*** 19.09*** 41.98*** 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 8: Estimation Results from the Four-factor Model 
 
  EW SW 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
α0 0.069 0.79 0.311*** 3.98 
RMRF -0.217* -1.97 -0.117* -1.80 
SMB -0.497*** -3.96 -0.288** -2.20 
HML -0.283*** 2.59 -0.098* -1.93 
Momentum 0.196 1.13 0.004 0.15 
Adj- 2R  0.247 0.378 
F-statistic   12.513***   21.047*** 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 9: Estimation of the Simultaneous Equation System 
 
Panel A: Result from Equation 1 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
EW SW 
ROA 
13.116 
(0.96)   
15.123*** 
(8.72)   
ROE  
7.82 
(0.47)   
7.248*** 
(6.07)  
Tobin’s Q   3.973 (0.39)   
3.797*** 
(5.17) 
SIZE 
0.411*** 
 (6.01) 
0.695*** 
(2.58) 
0.603 
(0.64) 
0.624*** 
(6.72) 
0.333*** 
(3.90) 
0.227** 
(2.14) 
Pre CSR 
0.351*** 
(7.51) 
0.459*** 
(11.42) 
0.278*** 
(4.67) 
0.325*** 
(7.00) 
0.449*** 
(11.86) 
0.381*** 
(8.58) 
Adj- 2R  0.175 0.182 0.111 0.253 0.276 0.204 
F-statistic 14.41*** 17.93*** 10.27*** 26.91*** 27.92*** 19.03*** 
Panel B: Result from Equation 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
ROA ROE Tobin's Q ROA ROE Tobin's Q 
EW 
0.000 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.99) 
0.000 
(0.57)    
SW    
0.002*** 
(3.38) 
0.001*** 
(2.78) 
0.044*** 
(3.50) 
SIZE 
0.002 
(1.43) 
0.004 
(1.55) 
0.069*** 
(5.20) 
0.002 
(1.49) 
0.004 
(1.56) 
0.051*** 
(2.94) 
1 tSales  0.199
***
 
(6.79) 
0.357*** 
(6.77) 
0.758*** 
(2.56) 
0.185*** 
(6.67) 
0.212*** 
(3.70) 
0.730** 
(2.44) 
tSales  0.127
***
 
(5.99) 
0.266*** 
(6.99) 
0.414* 
(1.95) 
0.106*** 
(6.02) 
0.197** 
(2.23) 
0.358* 
(1.66) 
RISK 
-0.078*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.093*** 
(2.53) 
-0.062 
(-0.30) 
-0.064*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.096*** 
(2.64) 
-0.150 
(-0.71) 
R&D 
0.383*** 
(4.33) 
0.567*** 
(3.57) 
0.692*** 
(7.76) 
0.392*** 
(4.47) 
0.580*** 
(3.69) 
1.599 
(0.38) 
Pre CSR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.003* 0.035* 
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(0.86) (0.31) (1.51) (2.11) (1.98) (1.83) 
Adj- 2R  0.200 0.197 0.210 0.247 0.216 0.391 
F-statistic 18.92*** 18.47*** 20.95*** 21.93*** 21.02*** 30.04*** 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 10: Granger Causality Tests for CSR and  
Corporate Financial Performance Measured by Tobin’s Q 
 
Panel A : EW → Tobin’s Q 
 Full Model Restricted Model     
 Estimate FM t-stat Estimate 
FM 
t-stat 
  p-value Causality 
Intercept -1.5423 -0.81 0.0858*** 4.04  2 Lags 0.21 no 
1' tQsTobin  0.1448*** 2.57 0.2743*** 3.88  1 Lag 0.13 no 
2' tQsTobin  0.0957* 1.89 0.1554*** 2.79     
1tEW  0.0035 0.73       
2tEW  0.0020 0.73       
Panel B : Tobin’s Q → EW 
 Full Model Restricted Model     
 Estimate FM t-stat Estimate 
FM 
t-stat 
  p-value Causality 
Intercept 0.5665 0.08 0.4790** 2.13  2 Lag 0.69 no 
1tEW  0.1851* 1.91 0.1626*** 2.36  1 Lag 0.33 no 
2tEW  0.1625* 1.85 0.0379* 1.79     
1' tQsTobin  0.8137 0.09       
2' tQsTobin  0.4663 0.87       
Panel C : SW → Tobin’s Q 
 Full Model Restricted Model     
 Estimate FM t-stat Estimate 
FM 
t-stat 
  p-value Causality 
Intercept 0.6599 0.56 0.0858*** 4.04  2 Lag 0.00 yes 
1' tQsTobin  0.2008** 2.14 0.2743*** 3.88  1 Lag 0.00 yes 
2' tQsTobin  0.0837* 1.86 0.1554*** 2.79     
1tSW  0.0136*** 2.96       
2tSW  0.0084** 2.07       
Panel D : Tobin’s Q → SW 
 Full Model Restricted Model     
 Estimate FM t-stat Estimate 
FM 
t-stat 
  p-value Causality 
Intercept 0.0858 0.63 0.0768 1.18  2 Lag 0.00 yes 
1tSW  0.2285** 2.22 0.2407*** 3.86  1 Lag 0.00 yes 
2tSW  0.1425* 1.90 0.1224** 2.21     
1' tQsTobin  0.7834*** 2.63       
2' tQsTobin  0.4539*** 2.37       
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Note: 1) ***, **, * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
2) FM t-stat is the Fama-MacBeth t-statistic. 
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Table 11: Estimation Results for Corporate Financial Performance 
for Each of CSR Categories (Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q) 
 
 Soundness Fairness Contribution to society  
Consumer 
protection 
Environmental 
protection 
Employee 
satisfaction 
Contribution 
to economy 
EW 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.08 (0.77) (1.03) (0.65) (1.09) (1.15) (1.30) (1.15) 
SW   0.05
***
  0.03*** 0.00 0.06***  0.13***   0.08***   0.13*** 
(7.67) (3.39) (0.13) (8.10) (4.01) (6.43) (2.79) 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
